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Thursday, March 2, 2017

UNLAWFUL  ACTION

The procedures for invoking the jurisdiction of a justice court must be strictly pursued. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev 134 (1865). A justice courts jurisdiction must affirmatively appear. Mallett v. Uncle Sam Mining, 1 Nev 188 (1865). A proper pleading is required to invoke a court's otherwise dormant jurisdiction. Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (concurring opinion) citing State ex rel Preissler v. Dostert, 260 SE2d 279 (WVa 1979). The party seeking to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have authority to do so. Ryan v. District Court, 503 P2d 842 (1972); Southwest Gas v. District Court, 85 Nev 40, 449 P2d 259 (1969). A court has no power to act in derogation of the constitution and laws of the sovereign for which it operates. Watson v. Housing Authority, 97 Nev 240, 627 P2d 405 (1958). A justice courts authority in felony cases is limited to probable cause determinations. Parsons v. District Court, 885 P2d 1316, 110 Nev 1239 (1994).

208-84FN Commenced June 15, 1984

The record below indicates that, at the first appearance, no party with a reasonable belief Mr. Rider committed any offense filed the written statement of essential facts required by NRS 171.178(4) to invoke the court's authority and inform him of an allegation he might prove false. Sanders v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 179, 451 P2d 718 (1968). The record further shows that the magistrate explained the charges, the rights involved and set bail at $80,000 to ensure future appearances in 208-84FN, for purposes other than a preliminary examination:



Whether by oral complaint or from extra-judicial knowledge, the initiation of 208-84FN could only have resulted from a complicit usurpation of executive, judicial, and legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev 13, 422 P2d 237 (1967). A complaint must be reduced to a sworn writing (NRS 171.102), filed with the court (NRS 171.178[4]) and provided to the accused. NRS 171.186. A court acquires no jurisdiction without a formal and sufficient accusation. Williams v. Municipal Court, 85 Nev 425, 456 P2d 440 (1969); In re Waterman, 29 Nev 288, 89 P 291 (1907). A judge has no authority to initiate a criminal action sua sponte. Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev 369, 915 P2d 245 (1996); Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev 551, 729 P2d 1328 (1986). Assuming the dual role of judge and complainant "could hardly be a more appropriate setting [ ] for a per se rule of disqualification." Coollidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971). The magistrate lacked authority to act upon and obligate a future kidnapping and sexual assault complaint. Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 508 P.2d 1015 (1973) (prosecution of crimes within exclusive control of district attorney). The magistrate was obligated instead to enforce the essentials of probable cause and adequate notice against law enforcement. United States v. Gross, 159 FSupp 316 (DC Nev 1958); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1975) (impartial judicial determination of probable cause is prerequisite to extended post-arrest restraint). Detention under bail without notice or a judicial determination of probable cause was a felony criminal offense. NRS 200.460. The magistrate’s acts and omissions were, ironically, the only criminal matter in the record of 208-84FN  -------- a record that neither required nor allowed any defense for want of the following:

1)  activity in the State of Nevada
2) testimony of a competent witness
         
No evidence was recorded. NRS 1.020.  No evidence was public. NRS 1.090. No offense could be amended. NRS 173.095(1). No transaction could be joined. NRS 173.115. The absence of facts showing probable cause at the onset of detention could not be rehabilitated by future testimony. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). 

Intervener, Amendment and Joinder

An action retains its character from commencement. Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat 537 (1824). The absence of proper parties at commencement of 208-84FN could not be remedied by the appearance of an additional party because that did not remove the party destroying jurisdiction i.e., the overreaching magistrate. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541 US 567 (2004). An intervener takes a case as he finds it. Moore v. District Court, 77 Nev 357, 364 P2d 1073 (1961).

Because 208-84FN commenced without a charge, it may never be characterized as a criminal action. NRS 169.055 (a criminal action is the proceedings by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment). 208-84FN will forever remain a judicially initiated action over which no court of law may acquire jurisdiction to proceed. Nev Const Art 3 Sec 1. An abuse of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments no party could lawfully join. NRS 200.460. The district attorney was obligated by such rules as 8.3(b) and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to report 208-84FN to proper authorities and abstain from participation.

A court devoid of jurisdiction cannot hear any party. It can only dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. New Orleans Mail Co. v. Flanders, La, 79 US 130 (1956); Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So2d 303 (Ala 2004); Phillips v. Bradshaw, 859 SW2d 232 (Mo 1993); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 859 P2d 420 (1993); Pratts v. Hurley, 806 NE2d 992 (Ohio 2004); MCI WorldCom v. Pennsylvania PUC, 844 A2d 1239 (2004); Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah Tax Comm., 870 P2d 291 (1994); Young v. Clark, 65 P3d 1192 (Wa 2003); Trujillo v. Serrano, 871 P2d 369 (NM 1994); People v. Mueller, 851 P2d 211 (Colo 1992); Geerts v. Jacobsen, 100 P3d 1265 (Wy 2008). No out-of-state witness could be lawfully compelled to appear and testify in 208-84FN.

The first appearance before a magistrate in a criminal action triggers the right to counsel under NRS 178.397 and the 6th Amendment. Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387 (1977). Counsel was not provided for Mr. Rider's second appearance in 208-84FN when a written complaint was filed without formal disposition of the original complaint --- and without the good cause, written findings and court order required by NRS 174.085(5) before a new complaint could be filed in 1984. Poceeding further in 208-84FN was therefore without the due process of law required in criminal actions. NRS 178.562 may bar a second complaint, or prosecution for same offense. 

Without proper motion or notice, the magistrate had no authority to allow the district attorney to intervene and amend or join any offense. Monroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975); Maheu v. District Court, 88 Nev 26, 493 P2d 709 (1972); Iveson v. District Court, 66 Nev 145, 206 P2d 755 (1949). No new offense could be added to the action by any amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115; Ex Parte Alexander, 80 Nev 354, 393 P2d 615 (1963) (want of allegation that crime occurred in Nevada cannot be cured by amendment). 208-84FN therefore remained under improper judicial control. Cf. Sheriff v. Davis, 106 Nev 145, 787 P2d 1241 (1990); Nev. Const. Art 3 Sec 1.

FRAUD UPON THE COURTS: Bracy v. Warden

The lop-sided half-record developed through the concerted acts and omissions of the magistrate, the complainants and the prosecutor to obstruct notice vitiated the adversarial process and the impartial decision making function of the courts:

A. Brady Material 

The absence of a proper pleading at the first (and second) appearance is an improper void in the record the details of which will forever remain a mystery to the defense. Parsons v. District Court, 110 Nev 1239, 1244 n 4, 885 P2d 1316 (1994) (magistrate's reliance on his own personal knowledge in adjudicating a matter in favor of defendant was prejudicial to the state); Ivey v. State, 82 Nev 448, 420 P2d 853 (1966) (in-camera review of probable cause denies precepts basic to our system of justice); Daniel v. State, 119 Nev 498, 78 P3d 890 (2003) (unrecorded interview with witness is improper); Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev 48, 993 P2d 25 (2000) (information provided orally, as opposed to written form, was inadequate under Brady); Lay v. State, 116 Nev 1185, 14 P3d 1256 (2000) (prior statement of witness is material). See also Shelby v. District Court, 82 Nev 204, 414 F2f 942 (1966) citing Scott v. State, 81 Nev 380, 404 P2d3 (1965) (probable cause cannot be determined in absence of complete record). This void is an apparent absence of probable cause ---- Factual Innocense ---- the prosecution was obligated to timely document and file in effort to invoke the court's jurisdiction at commencement of a criminal action. NRS 171.178(4)

B. False Complaint, False Evidence

A complainants conclusions are patently insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by an impartial magistrate. Watson v. Sheriff, 93 Nev 403, 566 P2d 416 (1977). 

The written complaint filed in 208-84FN was not qualified by information and belief but consisted instead of the direct and positive allegations of Officer T. Harry to give the appearance of probable cause without reference to second-hand information. DeHardit v. United States, 224 F2d 673 (4 Cir 1955). That complaint could only have been made by an eyewitness to its contents. NRS 199.200 (unqualified statement of what one does not know to be true is a false statement); Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (witness not present at time of alleged sexual assault is not competent to testify that victim consented). That complaint obviated the magistrate's duty under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964) to assess for himself the credibility of second-hand information as well as his duty under NRS 171.186 to disclose information to Mr. Rider and enable the investigation and impeachment of the subject matter that is authorized by NRS 171.196 prior to preliminary examination. The magistrate held Mr. Rider for further proceedings on Officer Harry's complaint without performing those constitutional judicial duties. 



It is unlikely Officer Harry would observe ongoing sexual activity if felonious at the time it occurred. The testimony adduced at the preliminary examination was not shown to have been evidence of those unlikely observations. NRS 50.025. As such, that testimony was no more than false evidence of the dubious crimes alleged in Officer Harry's complaint. Miller v. Pate, 386 US 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US 28 (1957). The allegations at that hearing had been shielded from investigation and impeachment which usurped the independent judicial credibility determinations required by Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 (1983), Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964) as well as Marcum v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 175, 451 P2d 845 (1969) and Scott v. State, supra. Omission of facts as those that follow should remove any doubt the outcome was compromised:

Neither Officer Harry nor the magistrate could be called as a witness to directly support or rebut the allegations adduced at the July 24th preliminary hearing because neither were present when those crimes allegedly occurred;

Engineers in passing trains and other eyewitnesses present at the alleged crime scene were omitted from the reporting witness's story and the police investigation;

The reporting witness changed the location of her alleged abduction and omitted some 4 hours of activity from her story. Within hours of asked if willing to take a polygraph test, she left the state and refused to cooperate.

C. NRS 171.206 

The 4th Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1975). Probable cause must be known at the time of an arrest. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). After acquired facts can not validate an arrest. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964). NRS 171.206 is thus unconstitutional to the extent it allows probable cause to be developed over 40 days of detention, physical abuse and threats of murder. Cf. Powell v. State, 108 Nev 700, 838 P2d 921 (1992) (statute allowing probable cause determination 72 hours after a warrantless arrest violates the 4th Amendment). Investigative detention could not lawfully exceed 30 minutes in 1984. NRS 171.123. A finding of probable cause at the preliminary examination could not expunge this 4th Amendment violation because, under Whiteley, nothing at that hearing could rehabilitate the void in the record at the onset of pretrial detention. Cf. Manuel v. City of Joliet, __ US __ (2017) (judicial determination of probable cause based on false statements does not expunge 4th Amendment violation). 

NRS 171.206 cannot give the magistrate power to strip an essential fact witness from the action by switching to allegations the complainants were not competent to address. Garnick v. District Court, 81 Nev 521, 407 P2d 163 (1965) (action may only proceed on allegations made at araignment). Phantom witnesses that vanish prior to trial should cause the end of that action. Boggs v. State, 95 Nev 911, 604 P2d 107 (1979) (bad faith and connivance). New and different offenses could not otherwise be added by amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115. See also State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev 257 (1871) (basis for detention under NRS 173.145 may not be altered by court or counsel). Prejudice to a defendant is a consideration under NRS 171.206. State v. Pansey, 61 Nev 330, 121 P2d 441 (1941). Committment for crimes distinct from those alleged at the onset of pretrial detention would nullify the rights granted by NRS 171.186 and NRS 171.196 and violate the 6th Amendment under Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1 (1970) or Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975) where prejudice is presumed. That would abandon the pending charges without adjudication, burden the trial court with allegations not subject to full examination and condition relief upon the waiver of speedy trial rights required by NRS 34.700. 

D. "Duly Filed" Information Required by Article 1 Section 8 to Vest Jurisdiction in a Trial Court

DUE means: just, proper, regular and reasonable. DULY means: in a proper manner; in accordance with legal requirements. Blacks Law, 7th Edition. In North Las Vegas "duly" in the constitution is the equivalent of lie, cheat and steal.


NRS 173.035(1) authorizes the filing of an Information when the defendant has (a) received an examination as provided by law before a justice of the peace or (b) waived his right to preliminary examination. Mr. Rider never waived examination. Sturrock v. State, 95 Nev 938, 604 P2d 341 (1979). 

The Information filed in district court case No. C67112 was upon the representation that Mr. Rider received preliminary examination as provided by law before a justice of the peace. The only possible examination here was for the crimes alleged in Officer Harry's complaint.

E. Defense Counsel Would Most Likely Have Conspired With Each Other, the NLVPD, the NLV City Attorney, the Prosecutor, the Magistrate and Judge Goldman to Elicit a Coerced Guilty Plea, But a Full and Fair Hearing Could Certainly Add or Remove Parties From That List

Defense counsel should have questioned the validity of their appointment and authorization to appear.

Defense counsel objected to a continuance of the preliminary examination and requested an OR but did not attempt to enforce the affected rights. 

Defense counsel did not seek dismissal pursuant to Ormound v. Sheriff, release pursuant to Ex parte Ah Kee, 22 Nev 374 (1895) or any hearing pursuant to Franks v. Delaware.

Counsel badgered Mr. Rider into demanding a polygraph test on the 84-4877 subject matter and delivered the unverified results to the prosecutor. 

Counsel "guaranteed" conviction at trial where judge Goldman was likely to impose consecutive maximum terms on each count.

SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

A. Non-Subjugated Victim

Officer Harry swears the female in his complaint was subjected to sexual penetration by nothing more than sexual penetration. Likewise, the identicle allegation in COUNT IV of the Information expressly negates inducement to sexual penetration, actual or constructive, and that restricts meaning of the term "against her will" to a state of mind declared by the legislature to be worthy of punishment. NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice who must be corroborated under NRS 175.291). 


Deadly force to prevent the sexual penetration alleged in COUNT IV would be punishable as murder. NRS 200.200 (killing must be absolutely necessary to prevent great bodily harm; would-be combatant must endeavor to avoid alleged conflict). There could be no victim of Involuntary Servitude because that crime requires subjugation by restraint, physical force or specified threat. NRS 200.463(1). COUNT IV thus fails to allege any form of non-consent proscribed by the Legislature, or the common law. Mills v. United States, 164 US 644 (1897) (force inherent in act of penetration is insufficient for non-consent). 

B. Strict Liability

The record shows no stipulation or agreement under EJDC Rule 7.50 to waive counsel, remedy, defense or defect. The canvass shows no explanation of the term "against her will" and never mentions non-consent, a lack of consent, a defense of consent, consent nor any criminal intent. Unless the record shows an admission to acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, the guilty plea was accepted in violation of due process. Hanley v. State, 97 Nev 130, 624 P2d 1387 (1981).

Mr. Rider's factual admission the female was "afraid to resist" and sexually penetrated "against her will" was not an admission of guilt under NRS 200.366 because his innocent intent and the females uncorroborated lack of desire are not mutually exclusive. Honeycutt v, State, 118 Nev 660, 56 P3d 362 (2002) (mistaken belief in consent negates the required criminal intent regardless of victim's belief in non-consent). Nor were his factual admissions competent because he, like Mr. Honeycutt, cannot read other peoples' minds or attest directly thereto. State v. Butner, 67 Nev 436, 220 P2d 631 (1950) (lay witness, after stating the facts, may give opinion on another's state of mind). The plea canvass plainly ignores the intent to act without consent that was an element of sexual assault in 1984. Williams v. State, 95 Nev 830, 603 P2d 694 (1979). 

  
Intercourse, without opposition in particular, suggests an innocent intent as does the non-compelled nature of the intercourse alleged in Count IV while the denial of kidnapping indicates the female was in a place of her own choosing. Despite this fair basis for an inference that intercourse would be or was voluntary, Judge Goldman inquired no further. He developed no factual basis for an opinion the female's will because Mr. Rider admitted the actual state of mind in Count IV. It was unnecessary to determine if she appeared afraid to resist for the added reasons that Mr. Rider was not charged with subjecting her to penetration by afraid to resist and did not agree to plead guilty to doing so. Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev 681, 669 P2d 244 (1983). His guilty plea only admitted the well pled facts in Count IV. Giese v. Chief of Police, 87 Nev 522, 489 P2d 1163 (1971).

The record shows no interjection from counsels because Mr. Rider was collectively singled out amidst disputed facts for conviction under a theory of strict liability: non-subjugated intercourse with an adult female regardless of contemporaneous acts or omissions and in spite of her liability under long standing criminal law. See e.g., Forsha v. State, 8 Nev 137 (1872) (self defense requires a good faith endeavor by would-be combatant to avoid alleged conflict); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice who must be corroborated); Lerner Shops v. Marin, 83 Nev 75, 423 P2d 398 (1967) (there can be no false imprisonment where victim submits to mere verbal direction unaccompanied by force or threat); NRS Chapter 201 (sex for gain, indecent exposure and public sex acts are crimes regardless of gender); NRS 195.020 (one who aids or abets an unlawful act is a principle who must be proceeded against and spanked as such); NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm). Whether the female culpably manifested consent was simply irrelevant.


The question of consent between two parties cannot be answered from this record as a matter of law because: a defendants duress is limited by NRS 194.010 to a fear of great bodily harm, exclusively, and regardless of race, nationality or gender. An inducement below that threshold would be untenable -- frivolous -- unlike Officer Harry's allegation of no inducement at all however.

JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE

NRS 194.010 barred punishment as a matter of law because: Mr. Rider could not have been conscious of the will alleged and pleaded to in COUNT IV.

The state mind that Mr. Rider possessed while inserting his penis into a conscious woman's exposed vagina was ignored at the change of plea hearing but an excerpt from an interview with the department of parole and probation sheds considerable light on that universally crucial subject:



Judge Goldman did not ensure Mr. Rider had been provided a copy of the PSI Report or afford him an opportunity to interpose objections which violated NRS 176.156 and due process, if material. Shields v. State, 97 Nev 472, 634 P2d 468 (1981). 

Judge Goldman admonished defense counsel that the lack of physical injury to the female was irrelevant and imposed a term of life without parole upon the bald assertion that her disappearance and refusal to cooperate with authorities was due to severe psychological trauma. 

Accordingly, judgment could not be imposed under NRS 200.366(2)(a) or (b) and was imposed instead for some undefined, generic, imaginary form of sexual assault never proscribed by the Legislature: 


The PSI report forwarded to the Department of Prisons recounts the allegations adduced at the preliminary examination ------- allegations for which Mr. Rider was actively denied notice and opportunity to defend personally or with the assistance of competent counsel. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 US 196 (1948). 

THE NETWORK BLOSSOMS

There was no direct appeal urging clarification, modification or nullification of existing state law nor demarcation of factual innocence thereunder. Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967) (to deny full opportunity to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to infect the proceeding with the danger of convicting the innocent). In this case, an apparent myth distinguishing voluntary sex from consensual sex went unquestioned.

In Mr. Rider's first habeas proceeding it was determined that defense counsel obtained sufficient facts to rebut the kidnapping but that he would have been convicted of sexual assault (86-00151H). But seeWright v. State, 94 Nev 415, 581 P2d 442 (1978) (the forcible taking necessary for the crime of robbery requires restraint under the kidnapping statute); United States v. Hearst, 563 F2d 1331 (9 Cir 1977) (defendant who claimed she was kidnapped and forced to rob banks was convicted of robbery because able to abandon her alleged captors). The determination that the guilty plea was not unduly motivated was thus unworthy of support from Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978) because that case requires probable cause to charge an offense defined by the legislature. Because the state offered no record to validate its threat, the record before the habeas courts was inadequate to conclusively show Mr. Rider was entitled to no relief on his claim that his plea was unknowing and involuntary. 


The States motion to dismiss Mr. Riders claims was not delivered to him by prison officials and granted by the court while his attorney's motion for relief based upon the State's failure to file an opposition was pending before the court. SeeMonroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975) (dispositive orders on motions without fair opportunity for the non-moving party to respond are improper); Gebers v. State, 118 Nev 500, 50 P3d 1092 (2002) (development of facts without prisoner's participation denies due process). The Nevada Supreme Court declined to expand the record on appeal pursuant to Bryant v. State, 102 Nev 268, 721 P2d 368 (1986) (entire trial court record should be reviewed) and dismissed without briefing or argument pursuant to Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev 681, 541 P2d 910 (1975) (third appeal cannot show error) while Mr. Rider's motion was pending for the appointment of counsel to assist him on his first appeal as of right:


That Mr. Rider's post-conviction efforts were thwarted by official misconduct grows even more apparent when considering: his inadequate canvass claim was procedurally defaulted because not raised on direct appeal. Davis v. State, 115 Nev 17, 974 P2d 658 (1999). By reaching the merits of that defaulted claim however, the original habeas courts implicitly found good cause from defense counsel's failure to perfect a direct appeal. Fawaz v. State, 105 Nev 682, 783 P2d 425 (1989). But instead of acknowledging that the original habeas courts erred by failing to presume prejudice under Strickland from counsel's failure to appeal, Justices Maupin, Agosti and Becker retreated to fabrications to dispose of Mr. Rider's subsequent request for appellate counsel. 




Their premise Mr. Rider waited until 1998 to request appellate counsel is patently false. Their position that an attorneys failure to appeal is a claim not subject to summary dismissal under NRS 34.810(1) or NRS 177.375 is flat contradicted by that court's own decision in Franklin v. State, 110 Nev 750, 877 P2d 1058 (1994) where they determined the only relief available in such cases was to appoint counsel to assist the prisoner with a belated appeal. If the specious theories applied to Mr. Rider were correct, arguendo, Mr. Franklin would have been entitled to withdraw his plea upon a finding that his attorney erred by failing to appeal. But that plainly was not the result in Franklin or in Mr. Rider's first habeas proceeding where he alleged his plea was entered without effective assistance, the courts implicitly found his attorney ineffective for failing to appeal, and relief was summarily denied. 


CHAPTER 3: Involuntary $ervitude

It should be obvious that two or more persons acted in concert to subject Mr. Rider and unknown others, without due process, to a form of 4th class citizenship, a component of which is the compulsion to service under ex-felon registration laws, by threat of death or imprisonment.

The relevant Tier III crimes under the Adam Walsh Act require the knowing use of force or fear of harm by the offender to evince the requisite intent. HR REP 99-594 (1986). Non-forced, non-commercial, private sex between adults is protected and does not require registration under the AWA. Green v. Georgia, 987 FSupp2d 1328 (2013) citing Powell v. State, 270 Ga 327, 510 SE2d 18 (1998).

The use or threat of violence is not an element of sexual assault. Weber v. State, 121 Nev 554, 119 P3d 107 (2005). The closest federal equivalent to that state offense is sexual contact without permission under 18 USC 2244(b) which was enacted in 1986 as a misdemeanor and became a felony by amendment in 2006. No conviction for a petty offense triggers a burden to register under the AWA because that act only targets those convicted of criminal offense. 42 USC 16911(5)(A). Therefore, a state conviction prior to 2006 for an offense equal to 18 USC 2244(b) cannot trigger Tier III burdens under the AWA without the retroactive elevation of a misdemeanor to a felony or the application of federal law by geographic happenstance.

NRS 179D.441 requires the targeted individual to routinely supply law enforcement with data for publication on a website, monitor and update that information when necessary to ensure the data is current within a 48 hour margin of error, at his own expense, in perpetuity. The fair market value of that on-call "civil" data service is estimated to exceed $250,000 per year, per individual, as the approximate cost to the Department of Public Safety of obtaining their desired information by alternate means, at their own expense. Restitution is mandatory. 18 USC 1593.

To withhold compensation for accepted services impinges the integrity of the characterization of registration laws as civil. 

The use of force rejected by the jury in Powell, inferred by the court in Weber and expressly disavowed by Count IV cannot serve as the foundation for a burden to register without implicating the right to jury trial and the prohibited Bill of Attainder.
 

DISCLAIMER 

* This blog is protected by 18 USC 1584(b) as a bona fide report of human trafficking activity by state actors.

* Count I alleges the female was [ ] inveigled and enticed [ ] against her will and without her consent.

* That a five year sentence under NRS 200.366(2)(b)(2) may be expired in three years creates a distinct punishment lacking guidelines necessary to safeguard fundamental rights.

*An affidavit of arrest based on information and belief derived from police reports compiled in NLVPD file No. 84-4877 was placed into the record of commitment filed in district court after examination. That fugitive document indicates Officer Harry most likely did not have first hand knowledge of the 84-4877 subject matter.

*The reporting witness was 19 years old, armed, unemployed, transient and, after drinking beer, reported walking home from a truck stop when pushed into a pickup truck where forced to sit in the middle.