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Thursday, March 2, 2017


The procedures for invoking a justice court's limited authority must be strictly pursued. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev 134 (1865). Its jurisdiction must affirmatively appear. Mallett v. Uncle Sam Mining, 1 Nev 188 (1865). A proper pleading is required to invoke a court's otherwise dormant jurisdiction. Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (concurring opinion) citing State ex rel Preissler v. Dostert, 260 SE2d 279 (WVa 1979). The party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction must have authority to do so. Ryan v. District Court, 503 P2d 842 (1972); Southwest Gas v. District Court, 85 Nev 40, 449 P2d 259 (1969). A court has no power to act in derogation of the constitution and laws of the sovereign for which it operates. Watson v. Housing Authority, 97 Nev 240, 627 P2d 405 (1958). A justice court's authority in felony cases is limited to probable cause determinations. Parsons v. District Court, 885 P2d 1316, 110 Nev 1239 (1994).

208-84FN Commenced June 15, 1984

The record of the first appearance indicates that no party with a reasonable belief Mr. Rider committed any offense filed the written statement of essential facts required by NRS 171.178(4) to (1) invoke the court's authority and (2) inform him of any allegation he might prove false. Sanders v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 179, 451 P2d 718 (1968) (the complaint is intended to provide notice of the charge and give the magistrate jurisdiction to hold preliminary examination). The record further indicates that the magistrate nonetheless explained charges, the rights involved and set bail at $80,000 to ensure Mr. Rider's future appearance in 208-84FN, for purposes other than preliminary examination:

Whether by oral complaint or from extra-judicial knowledge, the initiation of 208-84FN was a concerted usurpation of executive, judicial, and legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev 13, 422 P2d 237 (1967). A complaint must be reduced to a sworn writing (NRS 171.102), filed with the court (NRS 171.178[4]) and provided to the accused. NRS 171.186. A court acquires no jurisdiction without a formal and sufficient accusation. Williams v. Municipal Court, 85 Nev 425, 456 P2d 440 (1969); In re Waterman, 29 Nev 288, 89 P 291 (1907). A judge has no authority to initiate a criminal action sua sponte. Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev 369, 915 P2d 245 (1996); Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev 551, 729 P2d 1328 (1986). Assuming the dual role of judge and complainant "could hardly be a more appropriate setting [ ] for a per se rule of disqualification." Coollidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971). The magistrate had no authority to act upon a future sexual assault complaint. Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 508 P.2d 1015 (1973) (prosecution of crimes within exclusive control of district attorney). The magistrate was obligated instead to enforce the essentials of fairness as probable cause and notice against law enforcement. United States v. Gross, 159 FSupp 316 (DC Nev 1958); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1975) (judicial determination of probable cause is a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention). Detaining Mr. Rider under bail without notice or probable cause was without sufficient authority and, therefore, a felony criminal offense. NRS 200.460. The magistrate’s acts and omissions were, ironically, the only criminal matter in the record of 208-84FN  -------- a record that neither required nor allowed any defense by Mr. Rider for want of the following:

1) criminal activity in the State of Nevada
2) testimony of a competent witness
3) elements of a public offense
No evidence was recorded. NRS 1.020. The court's business was not public. NRS 1.090. No charge could be amended. NRS 173.095(1). No transaction could be joined. NRS 173.115. The void in the record at the onset of extended pretrial detention could not be rehabilitated by future testimony. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). The magistrate had no authority to proceed with Mr. Rider detained under bail because in violation of the 4th Amendment. 

Intervener, Amendment and Joinder

An action retains its character from commencement. Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat 537 (1824). The absence of proper parties at commencement could not be remedied by the appearance of an additional party because that did not remove the party destroying jurisdiction i.e., the overreaching magistrate. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541 US 567 (2004). An intervener takes a case as he finds it. Moore v. District Court, 77 Nev 357, 364 P2d 1073 (1961). A court devoid of jurisdiction cannot hear any party. It can only dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. New Orleans Mail Co. v. Flanders, La, 79 US 130 (1956); Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So2d 303 (Ala 2004); Phillips v. Bradshaw, 859 SW2d 232 (Mo 1993); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 859 P2d 420 (1993); Pratts v. Hurley, 806 NE2d 992 (Ohio 2004); MCI WorldCom v. Pennsylvania PUC, 844 A2d 1239 (2004); Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah Tax Comm., 870 P2d 291 (1994); Young v. Clark, 65 P3d 1192 (Wa 2003); Trujillo v. Serrano, 871 P2d 369 (NM 1994); People v. Mueller, 851 P2d 211 (Colo 1992); Geerts v. Jacobsen, 100 P3d 1265 (Wy 2008). An out-of-state witness certainly could not be compelled to appear and testify in an unlawful action. 

NLVJC Case No. 208-84FN commenced without a proper criminal charge and for that reason it may never be characterized as a criminal action. NRS 169.055 (a criminal action is the proceedings by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment). 208-84FN will forever remain a judicially initiated action over which no court of law may acquire jurisdiction to proceed. Nev Const Art 3 Sec 1. An abuse of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments no party could lawfully join. NRS 200.460. The district attorney was obligated by such rules as 8.3(b) and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to report 208-84FN to proper authorities, and abstain from participation.

Without notice or motion, the magistrate had no authority to allow the district attorney to intervene and amend or join. Monroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975); Maheu v. District Court, 88 Nev 26, 493 P2d 709 (1972); Iveson v. District Court, 66 Nev 145, 206 P2d 755 (1949). No new offense could be lawfully added by amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115; Ex Parte Alexander, 80 Nev 354, 393 P2d 615 (1963) (want of allegation that crime occurred in Nevada cannot be cured by amendment). 208-84FN thus remained under unlawful extra-judicial control. Cf. Sheriff v. Davis, 106 Nev 145, 787 P2d 1241 (1990).

Tardy compliance with rules affecting substantive rights is misconduct requiring dismissal with prejudice. State v. Austin, 87 Nev 81, 482 P2d 284 (1971); Maes v. Sheriff, 86 Nev 317, 468 P2d 332 (1970); Hill v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 234, 452 P2d 918 (1969); Oberle v. Fogliani, 82 Nev 428, 420 P2d 251 (1966). 

6th Amendment

The first appearance before a magistrate in a criminal action triggers the right to counsel under NRS 178.397 and the 6th Amendment. Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387 (1977). Counsel was not provided for Mr. Rider's second appearance in 208-84FN when a written complaint was sworn to and filed without formal disposition of an original complaint, and without the good cause, written findings and order required by NRS 174.085(5) before a remedial complaint could be filed in the same action. Where determined probable cause is or would be absent, a formal disposition would bar another complaint for the same offense. NRS 178.562(2). Proceeding further in 208-84FN was therefore without the due process of law required in criminal actions.

NRS 171.188 

NRS 171.188 is unconstitutional to the extent that it empowers a magistrate to delay appointing counsel and conducting a preliminary examination while pondering a request for counsel made in response to his denial of adequate notice. Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975).


The lop-sided half-record developed through the concerted acts and omissions of the magistrate, the complainants and the prosecutor to obstruct notice vitiated the adversarial process and the impartial decision making function of the courts:

A. Brady Material 

The absence of a proper pleading at the first (and second) appearance is an improper evidentiary void in the record the details of which will forever remain a mystery to the defense. Parsons v. District Court, 110 Nev 1239, 1244 n 4, 885 P2d 1316 (1994) (magistrate's reliance on his own personal knowledge to adjudicate a matter in favor of defendant was prejudicial to the state); Ivey v. State, 82 Nev 448, 420 P2d 853 (1966) (in-camera review of probable cause denies precepts basic to our system of justice); Daniel v. State, 119 Nev 498, 78 P3d 890 (2003) (unrecorded interview with reluctant witness is improper); Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev 48, 993 P2d 25 (2000) (information provided orally, as opposed to written form, was inadequate under Brady); Lay v. State, 116 Nev 1185, 14 P3d 1256 (2000) (prior statements of witness are material). See also Shelby v. District Court, 82 Nev 204, 414 F2f 942 (1966) citing Scott v. State, 81 Nev 380, 404 P2d3 (1965) (probable cause cannot be determined in absence of complete record). This evidentiary void is an apparent absence of probable cause ---- FACTUAL INNOCENSE ---- the prosecution was obligated to timely document and file in effort to invoke the court's jurisdiction at commencement of a criminal action. NRS 171.178(4). See also, California v. Trombetta, 467 US 469 (1984) (due process requires police to collect and preserve evidence material to guilt or punishment).

B. False Complaint, False Evidence

Conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by an impartial magistrate. Watson v. Sheriff, 93 Nev 403, 566 P2d 416 (1977). 

The written complaint filed in 208-84FN was not qualified by information and belief but consisted instead of the direct and positive allegations of Officer T. Harry to give the appearance of probable cause without reference to second-hand information.  DeHardit v. United States, 224 F2d 673 (4 Cir 1955). That prayer for a warrant could only have been made by an eyewitness to its contents. NRS 199.200 (unqualified statement of what one does not know to be true is a false statement); Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (witness not present at time of alleged sexual assault is not competent to testify that victim consented). Officer Harry's complaint obviated the magistrate's duty under  Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964) to assess the credibility of any second-hand information as well as his duty under NRS 171.186 to disclose such information to Mr. Rider and enable the investigation and impeachment of the subject matter authorized by NRS 171.196 prior to preliminary examination. The magistrate held Mr. Rider for further proceedings on that complaint without performing said constitutional judicial duties. 

It is unlikely Officer Harry would observe ongoing sexual activity if felonious at the time it occurred and the testimony adduced at the preliminary examination was not shown to have been actual evidence of those unlikely observations. NRS 50.025. As such, that testimony was no more than false evidence of the dubious crimes alleged in Officer Harry's complaint. Miller v. Pate, 386 US 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US 28 (1957). Insulating that testimony from facts as those that follow should remove any doubt the outcome was compromised:

Neither the magistrate nor Officer Harry could be called as a witness to directly support or rebut the testimony adduced at the preliminary hearing because neither witnessed the underlying facts;

Eyewitnesses in passing trains and others present at the times and locations in question were ommitted from the reporting witness's story, the police investigation and the preliminary examination;

Police recorded tire tracks but not one single footprint at or near their desert crime scene;
The reporting witness was 19 years old, armed, unemployed and transient who, after drinking beer, reported walking home from a truck stop when pushed into a pickup truck and forced to sit in the middle;

The reporting officer noted no outward sign of injury to the reporting witness, nor was her dress torn or dirty;

Some 4 hours of activity was omitted from the reporting witness' story. Within hours of being asked if willing to take a polygraph test, she left the state and refused to cooperate;
[ ]  [ ].

NRS 171.206 

The 4th Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1975). Probable cause must exist at the onset of detention. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). After acquired facts can not justify a seizure. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964). NRS 171.206 is thus unconstitutional to the extent it allows probable cause to be determined after 40 days of detention, isolation and threats of murder if Mr. Rider did not "fess up." Cf. Powell v. State, 108 Nev 700, 838 P2d 921 (1992) (statute allowing 72 hour delay following warrantless arrest violates 4th Amendment). 

NRS 171.206 cannot give a magistrate power to strip an essential fact witness from an action by switching to a subject matter none of the complainants were competent to address. Garnick v. District Court, 81 Nev 521, 407 P2d 163 (1965) (action may only proceed on allegations made at arraignment). Creating phantom witnesses to displace actual witnesses who vanish after commitment should prompt an end to the underlying action, see Boggs v. State, 95 Nev 911, 604 P2d 107 (1979) (bad faith and connivance procuring absence of witnesses justifies dismissal) as well as the indictment of those responsible. Separate and distinct offenses and transactions may not be added by amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115. See also State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev 257 (1871) (indictment, as basis for warrant and detention under NRS 173.145, may not be altered by court or counsel). Prejudice to the defense remains a concern under NRS 171.206. State v. Pansey, 61 Nev 330, 121 P2d 441 (1941). Committment for crimes distinct from those alleged at the onset of detention would nullify the safeguards granted by NRS 171.186 and NRS 171.196 and violate the 6th Amendment under Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1 (1970) or Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975) where prejudice is legally presumed. That would abandon pending charges without formal adjudication, burden the trial court and the defense with allegations not subject to safeguards enjoyed by others, and condition relief upon the waiver of speedy trial rights required by NRS 34.700. But see United States v. Hocker, 268 FSupp 264 (DC Nev 1967) (preliminary examination process must be equal in fairness to process by indictment). 

DUE means: just, proper, regular and reasonable. DULY means: in a proper manner; in accordance with legal requirements. Blacks Law, 7th Edition. In North Las Vegas that apparantly means lie, cheat and steal:

NRS 173.035(1) authorizes the filing of an Information when the defendant has (a) received an examination as provided by law before a justice of the peace or (b) waived his right to preliminary examination.

The Information filed in DC Case No. C67112 was upon the representation Mr. Rider received a preliminary examination upon the subject matter alleged in the written complaint, i.e., the unsubstantiated figments of Officer Harry's perverse imagination. 


The record shows no motion to dismiss or to suppress or to produce evidence withheld by the prosecution. The record shows no subpoena for a single defense witness.

A. Non-Subjugated Adult Victim

Officer Harry swears the female in his complaint was subjected to sexual penetration by nothing more than sexual penetration. The identicle allegation in COUNT IV of the Information limits the meaning of the term "against her will" to a state of mind declared by the legislature to be criminally liable. NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice who must be corroborated). 

Deadly force to prevent the penetration alleged in COUNT IV would be punishable as murder. NRS 200.200 (killing must be absolutely necessary to prevent great bodily harm; would-be combatant must endeavor to avoid alleged conflict). Any spirit of revenge would be unacceptable. NRS 200.130(1). There could be no victim of Involuntary Servitude because that crime requires subjugation by restraint, physical force or a specified threat. NRS 200.463(1). COUNT IV thus fails to allege any form of non-consent proscribed by the Legislature, or the common law. Mills v. United States, 164 US 644 (1897) (force inherent in act of penetration is insufficient non-consent of conscious adult). 

B. Strict Liability 

The record shows no stipulation or agreement under EJDC Rule 7.50 to waive counsel, remedy, defense or defect. The canvass shows no explanation of the term "against her will." It never mentions non-consent, a lack of consent, a defense of consent, consent nor any criminal intent. Unless the record shows an admission to acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, the guilty plea was accepted in violation of due process. Hanley v. State, 97 Nev 130, 624 P2d 1387 (1981).

Mr. Rider's factual admission that the female was "afraid to resist" and penetrated "against her will" was not an admission of guilt under NRS 200.366 because his innocent intent and the female's uncorroborated lack of desire are not mutually exclusive. Honeycutt v, State, 118 Nev 660, 56 P3d 362 (2002) (mistaken belief in consent may negate the requisite criminal intent, regardless of victim's wish or desire). Nor were Mr. Rider's factual admissions competent because he, like Mr. Honeycutt, cannot read other peoples' minds --- or testify directly thereto. State v. Butner, 67 Nev 436, 220 P2d 631 (1950) (lay witness, after stating facts, may give opinion on another's state of mind). The plea canvass plainly shows an irrational and involuntary admission to another's free will --- an imaginary fact --- which, incidentally, ignores the intent to act without consent that was a necessary element of sexual assault in 1984. Williams v. State, 95 Nev 830, 603 P2d 694 (1979). 

Intercourse, without opposition in particular, suggests an innocent intent as does the non-compelled nature of the intercourse alleged in Count IV while the denial of kidnapping indicates the female was in a public place of her own choosing. Despite this record basis for an inference that intercourse was voluntary, Judge Goldman inquired no further. That psychopath developed no factual basis for an opinion the female's will because Mr. Rider admitted the actual state of mind alleged in Count IV. That corroboration of the victim's will was not required. Bennett v. Leyapoldt, 77 Nev 429, 366 P2d 343 (1961). It was unnecessary to determine if she appeared afraid to resist for the added reason that Mr. Rider was not charged with subjecting her to penetration by or with afraid to resist and did not agree to plead guilty to doing so. Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev 681, 669 P2d 244 (1983) (terms of bargain must be honored). His guilty plea only admitted the well pled facts in Count IV. Giese v. Chief of Police, 87 Nev 522, 489 P2d 1163 (1971).

Absence of a "No"

The record shows no interjection from counsels because they were proceeding under a twisted theory of strict criminal liability, i.e., non-subjugated intercourse with an adult female regardless of any act or omission and in spite of her liability under long standing criminal law. See e.g., Forsha v. State, 8 Nev 137 (1872) (self defense requires a good faith endeavor by would-be combatant to avoid alleged conflict); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice who must be corroborated); Lerner Shops v. Marin, 83 Nev 75, 423 P2d 398 (1967) (there can be no false imprisonment where victim submits to mere verbal direction unaccompanied by force or threat); NRS Chapter 201 (sex for gain, indecent exposure and public sex are crimes regardless of gender); NRS 195.020 (one who aids or abets an unlawful act is a principle who must be proceeded against and spanked as such); NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm). Mens rea was reserved for post-conviction proceedings, if at all, where there is no right to notice, counsel, jury trial or meaningful appeal. But see, McNair v. State, 108 Nev 53, 825 P2d 571 (1992) (non-consent involves defendant's perception of victim's manifestations).

Absence of a "Yes"

The question of consent between two parties cannot be answered from the record as a matter of law because: a defendant's acts are willful unless induced by a fear of great bodily harm, exclusively, regardless of race, nationality, religion, political affiliation or gender. See NRS 194.010. Any inducement below that threshold would be rejected as legally untenable -- FRIVOLOUS -- unlike Officer Harry's sworn allegation of no inducement whatsoever.


The state mind Mr. Rider possessed while inserting his penis into a conscious woman's exposed vagina was ignored at the change of plea hearing, but an excerpt from an interview with the department of parole and probation sheds considerable light on that universally crucial subject:

Judge Goldman admonished counsel that the absence of physical harm to the victim was irrelevant. He imposed a term of life upon the State's bald assertion that the victim's refusal to cooperate was due to severe mental trauma. Sentence was not imposed under NRS 200.366(2)(a) or (b). It was imposed instead for some undefined, generic, imaginary form of sexual assault never proscribed by the Legislature : 


There was no motion to arrest judgment, vacate or modify sentence or any petition for prohibition, mandamus or habeas corpus.

There was no direct appeal urging the clarification, modification or nullification of existing state law nor demarcation of factual innocence thereunder. Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967) (to deny full opportunity to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to infect the proceeding with the clear danger of convicting the innocent). In this case, an apparent myth distinguishing voluntary sex from consensual sex went unquestioned.

In Mr. Rider's first habeas corpus proceeding it was determined that defense counsel obtained sufficient facts to rebut the kidnapping but that he would have been convicted of sexual assault (FJDC 86-00151H). But seeWright v. State, 94 Nev 415, 581 P2d 442 (1978) (the forcible taking necessary for the crime of robbery requires restraint under the kidnapping statute); United States v. Hearst, 563 F2d 1331 (9th Cir 1977) (defendant who claimed she was kidnapped and forced to rob banks was convicted of robbery because able to abandon her alleged captors); Montoya v. State, 185 SW 6, 79 Tex 332 cited CJS Rape § 15 (drunk 14 year old's fear of abandonment 5 miles outside El Paso does not support a conviction for forcible rape). The  court's determination that his guilty plea was not unduly motivated by threat of additional punishment was unworthy of support from Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978) because that case requires probable cause to charge an offense defined by the legislature. The State did not provide the habeas court with records necessary to make that determination which appears a clear admission to the legal deficiency of the justice court records and charging documents. The record before the habeas court was therefore inadequate to conclusively show Mr. Rider was entitled to no relief on his claim that his plea was coerced and involuntary. 

The States motion to dismiss Mr. Riders claims was not delivered to him by prison officials and granted by the court while his attorney's motion for relief based upon the State's failure to file an opposition was pending before the court. But seeMonroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975) (dispositive orders on motions without fair opportunity for the non-moving party to respond are improper); Gebers v. State, 118 Nev 500, 50 P3d 1092 (2002) (development of facts without prisoner's participation denies due process). The Nevada Supreme Court declined to expand the record on appeal pursuant to Bryant v. State, 102 Nev 268, 721 P2d 368 (1986) (entire trial court record should be reviewed) and dismissed without briefing or argument pursuant to Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev 681, 541 P2d 910 (1975) (third appeal cannot show error) while Mr. Rider's motion was pending for the appointment of counsel to assist him on his first appeal as of right:

That Mr. Rider's post-conviction efforts were thwarted by misconduct grows more apparent when considering that his inadequate plea canvass claim was procedurally defaulted because not raised on direct appeal. Davis v. State, 115 Nev 17, 974 P2d 658 (1999). By reaching the merits of that defaulted claim however, the original habeas courts implicitly found good cause from defense counsel's failure to perfect a direct appeal. Fawaz v. State, 105 Nev 682, 783 P2d 425 (1989). But instead of acknowledging that the original habeas courts erred by failing to presume prejudice from counsel's failure to appeal, Justices Maupin, Agosti and Becker relegated to fabrications to dispose of Mr. Rider's subsequent request for appellate counsel. 

Their assertion that Mr. Rider waited until 1998 to request appellate counsel is patently false. Their position that an attorney's failure to appeal invalidates a guilty plea for purposes of NRS 34.810(1) and NRS 177.375 is flat contradicted by that same court's decision in Franklin v. State, 110 Nev 750, 877 P2d 1058 (1994) where they determined the only relief available in such cases was to appoint counsel to assist the prisoner with a belated appeal. If the specious theories they applied to Mr. Rider were correct, arguendo, Mr. Franklin would have been allowed to withdraw his plea upon a finding that his attorney erred by failing to appeal. But that plainly was not the result in Franklin or in Mr. Rider's first habeas proceeding where he alleged his plea was entered without effective assistance, the courts found his attorney erred by failing to appeal, yet relief was summarily denied. 

CHAPTER 3: Involuntary $ervitude

It seems obvious that two or more persons acted in concert to subject Mr. Rider without due process to a form of 4th class citizenship a component of which is his compulsion to service under ex-felon registration laws, by threat of death or imprisonment.

The relevant federal Tier III crimes under the Adam Walsh Act require the knowing use of force or fear of harm by the offender to evince the requisite intent. HR REP 99-594 (1986). Non-forced, non-commercial, private sex between adults is protected and does not require registration under the AWA. Green v. Georgia, 987 FSupp2d 1328 (2013) citing Powell v. State, 270 Ga 327, 510 SE2d 18 (1998).

The use or threat of violence is not an element of sexual assault. Weber v. State, 121 Nev 554, 119 P3d 107 (2005). The closest federal equivalent to that state offense is sexual contact without permission under 18 USC 2244(b) which was enacted in 1986 as a misdemeanor. No conviction for such a petty offense against an adult can trigger a burden to register under the AWA because that act only targets those convicted of criminal offenses. 42 USC 16911(5)(A). Therefore, a state conviction prior to 2006 for an offense against an adult equal to 18 USC 2244(b) cannot trigger Tier III burdens under the AWA without the retroactive elevation of a misdemeanor to a felony, or the application of federal law by geographic happenstance.

NRS 179D.441 requires the targeted individual to routinely supply law enforcement with data for publication on a website, monitor and update that data when necessary to ensure it is current within a 48 hour margin of error, at his own expense, in perpetuity. The fair market value of that on-call "civil" data service is estimated to exceed $250,000 per year, per individual, as the approximate cost to the Department of Public Safety of obtaining their desired data by alternate means, at their own expense. Restitution is mandatory. 18 USC 1593.

The use of force rejected by the jury in Powell, inferred by the court in Weber and expressly disavowed by Count IV cannot serve as the foundation for a burden to register without implicating the right to jury trial and the prohibited Bill of Attainder. 


* This blog is protected by 18 USC 1584(b) as a bona fide report of human trafficking activity by state actors.

* Count I alleges that the victim was [ ] inveigled and enticed [ ] against her will and without her consent.

* That a 5 year term under NRS 200.366(2)(b)(2) could be expired in approximately 3 years created a distinct punishment lacking the guidelines necessary to safeguard fundamental rights of those required to serve 5 full years before the possibility of release without good time or work time credits.

*An Affidavit of Arrest based on information and belief derived police reports compiled in NLVPD file No. 84-4877 was merely placed into the record of commitment filed in district court after examination. That fugitive document indicates Officer Harry most likely did not have first hand knowledge of the 84-4877 subject matter.

*A 35 year old bible thumping psycho slutt residing at the reporting witness's address contacted police to make good on prior threat to falsely accuse Mr. Rider of rape in retaliation for her and her 19 year old boyfriend's eviction from Mr. Rider's home several months earlier.