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Thursday, March 2, 2017

UNLAWFUL  ACTION

The procedures for invoking a justice court's limited authority must be strictly pursued. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev 134 (1865). Its jurisdiction must affirmatively appear. Mallett v. Uncle Sam Mining, 1 Nev 188 (1865). A proper pleading is required to invoke a court's otherwise dormant jurisdiction. Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (concurring opinion) citing State ex rel Preissler v. Dostert, 260 SE2d 279 (WVa 1979). The party seeking to invoke the court's jurisdiction must have authority to do so. Ryan v. District Court, 503 P2d 842 (1972); Southwest Gas v. District Court, 85 Nev 40, 449 P2d 259 (1969). A court has no power to act in derogation of the constitution and laws of the sovereign for which it operates. Watson v. Housing Authority, 97 Nev 240, 627 P2d 405 (1958).  A justice court's authority in felony cases is limited to probable cause. Parsons v. District Court, 885 P2d 1316, 110 Nev 1239 (1994). Orders and judgments without authority are nullities even prior to reversal. Elliot v. Piersol, 26 US 328 (1828).

208-84FN Commenced June 15, 1984

The record of the first appearance indicates that no person with the requisite belief that Mr. Rider committed any criminal offense filed the written statement of essential facts that was required by NRS 171.178(4) to (a) invoke the court's authority and (b) inform Mr. Rider of any allegation he might prove false. Sanders v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 179, 451 P2d 718 (1968) (criminal complaint presents the subject matter for examination and provides the defendant notice of the nature and cause and for detention). The record further indicates that the magistrate explained charges, the rights involved and set bail at $80,000 to ensure Mr. Rider's future appearance in 208-84FN, for purposes seemingly other than preliminary examination:

Justice certainly does not here satisfy the appearance of justice 


Whether by oral complaint or from extra-judicial knowledge, the initiation of 208-84FN was a complicit usurpation of executive, judicial, and legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev 13, 422 P2d 237 (1967). A complaint must be reduced to a sworn writing (NRS 171.102), filed with the court (NRS 171.178[4]) and provided to the accused. NRS 171.186. It is the only basis for warrant in justice court. NRS 171.106. A court acquires no jurisdiction without formal and sufficient allegation. Williams v. Municipal Court, 85 Nev 425, 456 P2d 440 (1969); In re Waterman, 29 Nev 288, 89 P 291 (1907). A judge has no authority to initiate a criminal action sua sponte. Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev 369, 915 P2d 245 (1996); Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev 551, 729 P2d 1328 (1986). Assuming the dual role of both judge and complainant "could hardly be a more appropriate setting [ ] for a per se rule of disqualification." Coollidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971). Tumey v. Ohio, 273 US 510 (1927) (judicial bias is a structural defect not subject to harmless error analysis). The magistrate had no authority to act upon or obligate a future criminal complaint. Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 508 P.2d 1015 (1973) (prosecution of crimes within exclusive control of district attorney). That was an act of prejudice under NRS 1.230. The magistrate was obligated instead to enforce the requirements of probable cause and notice against law enforcement. United States v. Gross, 159 FSupp 316 (DC Nev 1958). Detaining Mr. Rider over 48 hours without an impartial judicial finding of probable cause violated the 4th Amendment under Gerstein, and that amounted to a criminal offense under. NRS 200.460 (detention without sufficient authority is false imprisonment). No explanation for any delay under NRS 171.178(3) was offered by the magistrate who's acts and omissions were, ironically, the only criminal matter in the record of 208-84FN  -------- a record that neither required nor allowed any defense for want of the following essential matter:

1)  activity in Nevada
2) testimony of a competent witness
3) all elements of a public offense
         
No evidence was recorded. NRS 1.020. Any related court business was not public. NRS 1.090. No charge could be amended or added. NRS 173.095(1). No transaction could be joined. NRS 173.115. The void in the record at onset of detention could not be rehabilitated by future testimony. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). It was a lack of the subject matter necessary for the court to lawfully proceed. 

6th Amendment

The first appearance before a magistrate triggers the right to counsel under NRS 178.397 and the 6th Amendment. Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387 (1977). A defendant may choose to represent himself if able to do so. Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975). 
Counsel was not provided for Mr. Rider's second appearance in 208-84FN when a written complaint was sworn to and filed in an attempt to rehabilitate the action, without formal disposition of the original complaint, and, thus, without the good cause, written findings and court order that was required by NRS 174.085(5before that written complaint could be filed in 1984. No explanation for the delay under NRS 171.178(3) was offered or elicited. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where original claim is so insubstantial as to be devoid of merit. Havens v. Lavine, 415 US 528 (1974); Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 US 661 (1974). See also Hale v. Burkhardt, 764 P2d 866 (1988) (allegations of criminal activity must plainly distinguish frivolity); Shapley v. State, 93 Nev 184 (1977) (amendment allowed where original Information was not insubstantial). Manipulation of rules to achieve the systemic award of unwarranted delay also justifies dismissal with prejudice. See Maes v. Sheriff, 86 Nev 316, 468 P2d 332 (1970); Oberle v. Fogliani, 82 Nev 428, 420 P2d 251 (1966). Investigative detention could not exceed 30 minutes in 1984. NRS 171.123. Delay to gather additional evidence was not allowed. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964). The failure to properly document, file and disclose the facts at the first appearance could not be fairly remedied. Proceeding further in 208-84FN was therefore without the due process of law required in criminal actions.

Intervener, Amendment and Joinder

An action retains its character from commencement. Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat 537 (1824). The absence of proper parties at the commencement of 208-84FN could not be remedied by the appearance of an additional party because that did not remove the party destroying jurisdiction, i.e., the over-reaching magistrate. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541 US 567 (2004). 208-84FN commenced without any semblance of a proper charge and for that reason may never be characterized as a criminal action. NRS 169.055 (a criminal action is the proceedings by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial ...). 208-84FN will forever remain an unlawful action over which no court of law may acquire jurisdiction to proceed. Nev Const Art 3 Sec 1. The district attorney was obligated by such rules as 8.3(b) and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to report 208-84FN to proper authorities and abstain from participation therein. An intervener takes a case as he finds it. Moore v. District Court, 77 Nev 357, 364 P2d 1073 (1961). What was found here was Mr. Rider detained without sufficient lawful authority and on a condition of payment. He certainly lacked authority to compel an out of state witness to appear and testify in that action. NRS 200.310(2). 

Without proper notice or motion, the magistrate had no authority to allow the district attorney to intervene and amend or join. Monroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975); Maheu v. District Court, 88 Nev 26, 493 P2d 709 (1972); Iveson v. District Court, 66 Nev 145, 206 P2d 755 (1949). No new offense could be added by amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115. The want of an allegation that a crime occurred in the state of Nevada could not be cured by amendment. Ex Parte Alexander, 80 Nev 354, 393 P2d 615 (1963). 208-84FN therefore remained an usurpation of legislative, judicial and executive powers even after appearance of the district attorney who's only real hope was for a public defender and a guilty plea. 


FRAUD UPON THE COURTS, THE ACCUSED AND PUBLIC JUSTICE

The lop-sided half-record developed through the concerted acts and omissions of the magistrate, the complainants, the prosecutor and the public defender's office to obstruct notice vitiated the adversarial process and the impartial decision making function of the courts:

A. Brady Material 

The absence of a proper pleading at the first (and second) appearance is an improper evidentiary void in the record the details of which will forever remain a mystery to the defense. Parsons v.District Court, 110 Nev 1239, 1244 n 4, 885 P2d 1316 (1994) (magistrate's reliance on his own personal knowledge to adjudicate a matter in favor of defendant was prejudicial to the state); Ivey v. State, 82 Nev 448, 420 P2d 853 (1966) (in-camera review of probable cause denies precepts basic to our system of justice); Daniel v. State, 119 Nev 498, 78 P3d 890 (2003) (unrecorded in chambers interview with reluctant witness is improper); Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev 48, 993 P2d 25 (2000) (information provided orally, as opposed to written form, was inadequate under Brady); Lay v. State, 116 Nev 1185, 14 P3d 1256 (2000) (prior witness statements are material); Scott v. State, 81 Nev 380, 404 P2d 3 (1965) (probable cause cannot be fairly determined in absence of complete record). The void in the record here is an apparent absence of probable cause ---- FACTUAL INNOCENCE ---- the state was obligated to timely document and file in effort to invoke the court's jurisdiction at commencement. See NRS 171.178(4). See also California v. Trombetta, 467 US 479 (1984) (there is a duty to preserve evidence the defense could be expected to use). The inherent denial of adequate notice constructively denied the assistance of counsel by fully eliminating the intelligent communication enjoyed by others similarly situated.

B. False Complaint, False Evidence, or Both

Conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by an impartial magistrate. Watson v. Sheriff, 93 Nev 403, 566 P2d 416 (1977). 

The written complaint filed on June 22nd was not qualified by information and belief but consisted instead of the direct and positive allegations of Officer T. Harry to give the appearance of probable cause without reference to second-hand information.  DeHardit v. United States, 224 F2d 673 (4 Cir 1955). That prayer for a warrant could only have been made by an eyewitness to its contents. NRS 199.200 (unqualified statement of what one does not know to be true is a false statement); Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (witness not present at time of alleged sexual assault is not competent to testify that victim consented). That complaint obviated the magistrate's duty under  Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964) and Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213 (1983) to assess the credibility of second-hand information and his duty under NRS 171.186 to disclose such information to Mr. Rider and enable the communication, investigation and impeachment of the subject matter authorized by NRS 171.196 prior to preliminary examination. See Frank's v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978). The magistrate held Mr. Rider for further proceedings on that complaint without performing those constitutional judicial duties. 



It is unlikely Officer Harry would observe ongoing sexual activity if felonious at the time it occurred and the testimony adduced at the July 24th preliminary examination was not shown to have been evidence of those unlikely observations. NRS 50.025. As such, that testimony was no more than false evidence of the dubious crimes alleged in Officer Harry's written complaint. Miller v. Pate, 386 US 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US 28 (1957). Such testimony could never validate detention under Gerstein. See Manuel v. City of Joliet, 580 US ___ (2017) (false evidence is not probable cause).  

C. NRS 171.206 

The 4th Amendment requires an impartial judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1975). Probable cause must exist at the onset of detention. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). After acquired facts can not validate a seizure. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964). NRS 171.206 is therefore unconstitutional to the extent that it allows the sole probable cause determination in a case to be delayed until after fourty (40) days of isolation, jail-house informants, recorded phone calls, assault, battery, and ... threats of murder by police if Mr. Rider did not "fess up." Cf. Powell v. State, 108 Nev 700, 838 P2d 921 (1992) (statute allowing 72 hour delay following warrantless arrest violates 4th Amendment). 

NRS 171.206 can not empower a magistrate to strip an essential fact witness from an action by switching to a subject matter none of the complainants were competent to address. Garnick v. District Court, 81 Nev 521, 407 P2d 163 (1965) (action may only proceed on allegations made at arraignment). Phantom witnesses who displace actual witnesses and vanish at or after commitment should prompt an end to the underlying action. See Boggs v. State, 95 Nev 911, 604 P2d 107 (1979) (bad faith and connivance justifies dismisal). 

Separate and distinct offenses or transactions flat may not be added by any amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115. See also State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev 257 (1871) (subject matter of warrant for detention under NRS 173.145 may not be altered by court or counsel). Prejudice remains a concern under NRS 171.206. State v. Pansey, 61 Nev 330, 121 P2d 441 (1941). Committment for crimes separate and distinct from those alleged in the complaint would nullify the safeguards enjoyed by others under NRS 171.186 and NRS 171.196 and the 6th Amendment under Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1 (1970) or Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975) where prejudice may be legally presumed. 

Committment for crimes separate and distinct from those alleged in a complaint denies the same 4th amendment protections enjoyed by those proceeded against by indictment and arrested under warrant issued pursuant to NRS 173.145. 

Committment for crimes separate and distinct from those alleged in the complaint would require disposition of the crimes alleged in the complaint, abdicate the duty to provide timely examination, and condition relief upon a waiver of speedy trial rights under NRS 34.700. But see State v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 P. 300 (1915) (magistrate should order new complaint and schedule a new examination). That would allow the magistrate to charge offenses, absent constitutional power to do so.  Parsons v. District Court, 110 Nev 1239, 1244 n 4, 885 P2d 1316 (1994); Nev. Const. Art 3, Section 1. Facts such as as those that follow should remove any doubt the outcome here was compromised:

Neither the magistrate nor Officer Harry could be called as a witness to rebut the facts alleged at the preliminary examination because neither of those complainants where present when the crimes then and there allegedly occurred;

The reporting witness in NLVPD 84-4877 was 19, armed, unemployed and transient. After drinking beer for some time, she reported walking home from a truck stop when pushed up into a pickup truck and forced to sit in the middle. Approximately 3 hours of activity was omitted from her story. When asked if willing to take a polygraph test, she left the state and refused to cooperate.


In Nevada, no person may be tried except upon [ ] Information duly filed. DULY means in a proper manner; in accordance with legal requirements. Blacks Law, 7th Edition. In North Las Vegas that constitutional ideal means lie, cheat and steal:

NRS 173.035(1) authorizes the filing an Information when the defendant (a) has received an examination as provided by law and been committed or (b) waived his right to preliminary examination. 


The Information filed in EJDC Case No. C67112 was upon the representation that Mr. Rider received a preliminary examination as its filing was not preceded by a waiver by Mr. Rider of his right to preliminary examination. Cf. Sturrock v. State, 95 Nev 938 (1979). See also Morford v. Hocker, 394 F2d 269 (9 Cir 1968) citing Hurtado v. California, 110 US 516 (1884) (complaint process equal in fairness to prosecution by Indictment). Officer Harry's written complaint was never dismissed.

B. Non-Subjugated Conscious Adult

Officer Harry swears the female in his complaint was subjected to sexual penetration by nothing more than sexual penetration. The very same allegation in COUNT IV of the Information limits any meaning of the term "against her will" to a state of mind declared by the legislature to be criminally liable. NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm). See also Basurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of bodily harm is not an accomplice who must be corroborated). 


Deadly force to prevent the penetration alleged in COUNT IV would be punishable as murder. NRS 200.200 (killing must be absolutely necessary to prevent great bodily harm; would-be combatant must endeavor to avoid alleged conflict). There could be no victim of Involuntary Servitude by comparison because that crime requires subjugation by restraint, physical force or specified threat. NRS 200.463(1). COUNT IV thus fails to allege any form of non-consent proscribed by the Legislature, or the common law. Mills v. United States, 164 US 644 (1897) (force inherent in act of penetration is insufficient to establish non-consent of conscious adult). 

C. Strict Criminal Liability 

The plea canvass shows no explanation of the term "against her will." It never mentions non-consent, a lack of consent, a defense of consent, consent nor any criminal intent. Unless the canvass shows an admission to acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, the guilty plea was accepted in violation of due process. Hanley v. State, 97 Nev 130, 624 P2d 1387 (1981).

Mr. Rider's factual admission that the female was "afraid to resist" and penetrated "against her will" was not an admission of guilt under NRS 200.366 because his innocent intent and the female's uncorroborated lack of desire are not mutually exclusive. Honeycutt v, State, 118 Nev 660, 56 P3d 362 (2002) (mistaken belief in consent may negate the requisite criminal intent regardless of victim's lack of desire). Nor were Mr. Rider's admissions competent because he, like Mr. Honeycutt, cannot read other peoples' minds --- or testify directly thereto. State v. Butner, 67 Nev 436, 220 P2d 631 (1950) (lay witness, after stating objective facts, may give opinion on another's state of mind). The canvass plainly shows an irrational confession to another's free will --- an imaginary fact --- which ignores the 'intent to act without consent' that was a necessary element of sexual assault at the time of Mr. Rider's arrest and detention. Williams v. State, 95 Nev 830, 603 P2d 694 (1979) (necessary intent to act without consent shown by use of threats and intimidation against victims). 

  
Intercourse, without opposition in particular, suggests an innocent intent as does the non-compelled nature of the intercourse alleged in Count IV while Mr. Rider's denial of kidnapping suggests the female was in a public place of her own choosing. Despite this record basis for an inference that intercourse was voluntary and that criminal intent was lacking, Judge Goldman inquired no further. That psychopath developed no factual basis to corroborate the female's will because Mr. Rider had confessed the actual state of mind in Count IV. See Bennett v. Leypoldt, 77 Nev 439, 366 P2d 343 (1961) (rape victim's allegations need no corroboration). It was not necessary to ask what the female was afraid of or if she appeared 'afraid to resist' for the added reason that Mr. Rider was not charged with subjecting her to penetration with 'afraid to resist' and he did not agree to plead guilty to doing so. Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev 681, 669 P2d 244 (1983) (terms of bargain must be honored). His guilty plea only admitted the well pled facts in Count IV. Giese v. Chief of Police, 87 Nev 522, 489 P2d 1163 (1971). 

The record shows no interjection from counsels because Mr. Rider was singled out amidst disputed facts for conviction under a theory of strict criminal liability, i.e., non-compelled intercourse with a conscious adult female regardless of her objective manifestations and liability under long standing criminal law. But see McNair v. State, 108 Nev 52, 825 P2d 571 (1992) (essential element of non-consent focuses on the defendant's perception of victim manifestations). Mens rea was reserved, if at all, for post-conviction proceedings where there is no right to notice, counsel, jury trial or meaningful appeal. This appears further supported by the fact that a plea of nolo contendre, where unable or unwilling to admit guilt, would have required a factual basis from which to conclude that sexual penetration was against one or more partys' will or without their consent. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 US 25 (1970). 

D. Equal Protection of the Law

It is humanly impossible for one to be conscious of another's will. NRS 194.010(6) should therefore have barred punishment for sexual activity that one could not have been fully conscious of.

The question of consent between two parties cannot be answered from the record as a matter of law because: a defendant's acts and omissions are willful unless induced by a fear of great bodily harm, exclusively, and regardless of race, religion or gender. NRS 194.010. Any inducement below that threshold was untenable -- FRIVOLOUS -- unlike Officer Harry's sworn allegation of no victim inducement whatsoever.

E. Judgment and Sentence

Although the state of mind Mr. Rider possessed when confronted with a conscious woman's exposed vagina was ignored at the change of plea hearing, an excerpt from a subsequent interview with the department of parole and probation sheds considerable light on that universally crucial subject:



Judge Goldman chided counsel that the absence of physical injury to the victim was irrelevant. He imposed a term of life upon the deputy district attorney's bald assertion that the victim's disappearance and refusal to cooperate was due to severe mental trauma. That sentence plainly was not imposed under NRS 200.366(2)(a) or (b) but instead for some undefined, generic, imaginary form of sexual assault never proscribed by the Legislature : 

Hate Crime



THE NETWORK BLOSSOMS

The record shows no agreement between the parties to waive remedy, defense or defect pursuant to EJDC Rule 7.50 or otherwise. 

The record flat shows no waiver of jury trial. That record casts suspect light on waiver of the right to counsel because McCarthy did not represent Mr. Rider in justice court or secure the attendance of a single independent eyewitness to rebut the 84-4877 subject matter at the preliminary examination.




There was no appeal by counsel urging the clarification, modification or nullification of existing state law nor the demarcation of factual innocence thereunder. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967) (to deny full opportunity to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to infect the proceeding with the clear danger of convicting the innocent); Sanchez v. State,  85 Nev 95, 450 P2d 793 (1969) (appeal of previously undefined statutory term is not frivolous). As a result, an apparent myth distinguishing voluntary sex from consensual sex went unchallenged.

Habeas corpus proceedings were initiated in the First Judicial District Court where it was determined that defense counsel obtained sufficient facts to rebut the kidnapping but that Mr. Rider would have been convicted of sexual assault (FJDC Case No. 86-00151H). But seeWright v. State, 94 Nev 415, 581 P2d 442 (1978) (forcible taking necessary for crime of robbery requires restraint under the kidnapping statute); United States v. Hearst, 563 F2d 1331 (9th Cir 1977) (defendant who claimed she was kidnapped and forced to rob banks was convicted of robbery because able to abandon her alleged captors). See also Montoya v. State, 185 SW 6, 79 Tex 332 cited CJS Rape § 15 (fear of abandonment 5 miles outside El Paso does not support a conviction for forcible rape). Thae court's determination that the guilty plea was not unduly motivated was unworthy of support from Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978) because that case requires probable cause to charge an offense defined by the legislature and the State here did not provide the habeas court with the records necessary to make that determination. As a result, the record before the original habeas court was inadequate to conclusively show Mr. Rider was entitled to no relief on his claim that his plea was coerced and involuntary. "We abhor the thought that one could be compelled to stand trial without a preliminary showing of probable cause simply because the prosecutor refused to allow a record to be made [ ]." Scott v. State,  81 Nev 380, 404 P2d 3 (1965).


The States motion to dismiss Mr. Riders claims was not delivered to him by prison officials and granted by the court while his attorney's motion for relief based upon the State's failure to file an opposition was pending before the court: 



But seeMonroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975) (dispositive orders on motions without fair opportunity for the non-moving party to respond are improper); Gebers v. State, 118 Nev 500, 50 P3d 1092 (2002) (development of facts without prisoner's participation denies due process). The Nevada Supreme Court declined to expand the record on appeal pursuant to Bryant v. State, 102 Nev 268, 721 P2d 368 (1986) (entire trial court record should be reviewed) and dismissed without briefing or argument pursuant to Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev 681, 541 P2d 910 (1975) (third appeal cannot show error) while a motion was pending for the appointment of counsel to assist Mr. Rider on his first appeal as of right:


That Mr. Rider's post-conviction efforts were thwarted by official misconduct grows more apparent when considering that his inadequate plea canvass claim was procedurally defaulted because not raised on direct appeal. Wheby v. Warden, 550 P2d 419 (1976). By reaching the merits of that defaulted claim however, the original habeas courts implicitly found good cause from defense counsel's failure to perfect a direct appeal. Fawaz v. State, 105 Nev 682, 783 P2d 425 (1989). But instead of acknowledging that the original habeas courts erred by failing to presume prejudice from counsel's failure to appeal, Justices Maupin, Agosti and Becker relegated to fabrications to summarily dispose of Mr. Rider's subsequent request for appellate counsel. 




Their assertion that Mr. Rider waited until 1998 to request appellate counsel is patently false. Their position that an attorney's failure to appeal invalidates a guilty plea for purposes of NRS 34.810(1) and NRS 177.375 is flat contradicted by that same court's decision in Franklin v. State, 110 Nev 750, 877 P2d 1058 (1994) where they determined the only relief available in such cases was to appoint counsel to assist the prisoner with a belated appeal. If the specious theories they applied to Mr. Rider were correct, arguendo, Mr. Franklin would have been allowed to withdraw his plea upon a finding that his attorney erred by failing to appeal. But that plainly was not the result in Franklin or in Mr. Rider's first habeas proceeding where he alleged his plea was entered without effective assistance, the courts found his attorney erred by failing to appeal, and relief was summarily denied. 

CHAPTER 3: Involuntary $ervitude

It should be obvious that two or more persons acted in concert to subject Mr. Rider without due process to a form of 4th class citizenship a component of which is the compulsion to service under ex-felon registration laws by threat of death or imprisonment.

The relevant federal Tier III crimes under the Adam Walsh Act require the knowing use of force or fear of harm by the offender to evince the requisite intent. HR REP 99-594 (1986). Consent is not a defense. Id. Non-forced, non-commercial, private sex between adults is protected and does not require registration under the AWA. Green v. Georgia, 987 FSupp2d 1328 (2013) citing Powell v. State, 270 Ga 327, 510 SE2d 18 (1998).

Because the use or threat of violence is not an element of sexual assault, Weber v. State, 121 Nev 554, 119 P3d 107 (2005), the closest federal equivalent to that state offense is sexual contact without permission under 18 USC 2244(b) which was enacted in 1986 as a misdemeanor. No conviction for that petty offense against an adult can trigger a burden to register under the AWA because that act only targets those persons convicted of criminal offenses. 42 USC 16911(5)(A). Wherefore, a state conviction prior to 2006 for an offense against an adult equal to 18 USC 2244(b) cannot trigger Tier III burdens under the AWA without the retroactive elevation of a misdemeanor to a felony and the application of federal law by geographic happenstance.

NRS 179D.441 requires the targeted individual to routinely supply law enforcement with data for publication on a website, monitor and update that data when necessary to ensure it is current within a 48 hour margin of error, at his own expense, in perpetuity. The fair market value of that on-call "civil" data service is estimated to exceed $250,000 per year, per individual, as the approximate cost to the Department of Public Safety of obtaining their desired data by alternate means, at their own expense. Refusing to pay fair market value for services accepted is not civil. That is a tort. Restitution is mandatory. 18 USC 1593. 


The use of force rejected by the jury in Powell, inferred by the court in Weber and expressly disavowed by Count IV cannot serve as the foundation for a burden to register without implicating the right to jury trial and the prohibited Bill of Attainder. 

DISCLAIMER 

* This blog is protected by 18 USC 1584(b) as a bona fide report of human trafficking activity by state actors.

* Count I alleges that the victim was [ ] inveigled and enticed [ ] against her will and without her consent.

* That a 5 year term under NRS 200.366(2)(b)(2) could be expired in approximately 3 years created a distinct punishment lacking the guidelines necessary to safeguard fundamental rights of those required to serve a minimum of 5 full years before any possibility of release.

*An Affidavit of Arrest based on information and belief derived police reports compiled in NLVPD file No. 84-4877 was never filed or served on Mr. Rider but was merely placed into the record after commitment. That fugitive document indicates Officer Harry most likely did not have first hand knowledge of the 84-4877 subject matter.


*A 30 year old bible thumping psycho slutt, professed gang associate, ex-wife of a police officer and enemy of Mr. Rider residing at the reporting witness' address contacted the department to make good on a threat to falsely accuse Mr. Rider of rape in retaliation for her and her 19 year old boyfriend's eviction from his home months earlier.

*Ms. McCarthy's apparent conflict of interest may well have arisen from a relationship with Mr. Rider at NAU in the early 1970's.