WARNING: this site contains Graphic Material

Thursday, March 2, 2017


The procedures for invoking the jurisdiction of a justice court must be strictly pursued. Paul v. Armstrong, 1 Nev 134 (1865). Its acquisition of jurisdiction must affirmatively appear. Mallett v. Uncle Sam Mining, 1 Nev 188 (1865). A proper pleading is required to invoke a court's otherwise dormant jurisdiction. Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (concurring opinion) citing State ex rel Preissler v. Dostert, 260 SE2d 279 (WVa 1979). The party seeking to invoke a court's jurisdiction must have authority to do so. Southwest Gas v. District Court, 85 Nev 40, 449 P2d 259 (1969). A court has no power to act in derogation of the constitution and laws of the sovereign for which it operates. Watson v. Housing Authority, 97 Nev 240, 627 P2d 405 (1958). A justice courts authority in felony cases is limited to holding a preliminary hearing and authorized matters incident thereto. Parsons v. District Court, 885 P2d 1316, 110 Nev 1239 (1994).

208-84FN Commenced June 15, 1984

The record of NLVJC Case No. 208-84FN indicates, at the first appearance before a magistrate, no party with a reasonable belief that Mr. Rider committed any offense filed the written statement of essential facts required by NRS 171.178(4) to invoke the court's jurisdiction and inform him of any allegation that might be proven false. Sanders v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 179, 451 P2d 718 (1968) (criminal complaint provides defendant notice of charge he must defend and gives magistrate jurisdiction to hold a preliminary examination). The record further reveals that the magistrate nonetheless explained charges, the rights involved and set bail at $80,000 to ensure future appearances in 208-84FN, for purposes other than preliminary examination. 

Whether by oral complaint or from extra-judicial knowledge, the initiation of 208-84FN was a complicit usurpation of executive, judicial, and legislative power. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev 13, 422 P2d 237 (1967). A complaint must be reduced to a sworn writing (NRS 171.102), filed with the court (NRS 171.178[4]) and provided to the accused. NRS 171.186. A court acquires no jurisdiction without a formal and sufficient accusation. Williams v. Municipal Court, 85 Nev 425, 456 P2d 440 (1969); In re Waterman, 29 Nev 288, 89 P 291 (1907). A judge has no authority to initiate a criminal action sua sponte. Attorney General v. Steffen, 112 Nev 369, 915 P2d 245 (1996); Cunningham v. District Court, 102 Nev 551, 729 P2d 1328 (1986). Assuming the dual role of judge and complainant "could hardly be a more appropriate setting [ ] for a per se rule of disqualification." Coollidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443 (1971); Whitehead v. Commission on Judicial Discipline, 110 Nev 874, 878 P2d 913 (1994). The magistrate lacked authority to obligate a future complaint. Cairns v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 113, 508 P.2d 1015 (1973) (prosecution of crimes within exclusive control of district attorney). The magistrate was obligated instead to enforce the essentials of probable cause and notice against law enforcement. United States v. Gross, 159 FSupp 316 (DC Nev 1958). Detention under bail without due process was a criminal offense. NRS 200.460. The magistrate’s acts and omissions were, ironically, the only criminal matter in the record of 208-84FN  -------- a record that required nor allowed any defense by Mr. Rider for want of the following matter:

1)  a crime within the State of Nevada
2)  a crime within the statute of limitations
3)  testimony of a competent witness
No evidence was recorded. NRS 1.020. The court's business was not public. NRS 1.090. There was no offense that could be amended. NRS 173.095(1). There was no transaction that could be joined. NRS 173.115. The complete absence of facts before the magistrate could not be rehabilitated by future testimony. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 US 560 (1971). 208-84FN was a dead horse at commencement.

Intervener, Amendment and Joinder

An action retains its jurisdictional character from commencement. Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat 537 (1824). The absence of a proper party at the commencement of 208-84FN could not be remedied by the mere intervention of an additional party because that did not remove the party destroying jurisdiction i.e., the magistrate. Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, 541 US 567 (2004). Moreover, an intervener takes a case as he finds it. Moore v. District Court, 77 Nev 357, 364 P2d 1073 (1961).

Because 208-84FN commenced without a charge, it may never be characterized as a criminal action. NRS 169.055 (a criminal action is the proceedings by which a party charged with a public offense is accused and brought to trial and punishment). 208-84FN will forever remain an instance of misconduct over which no court of law may acquire jurisdiction to proceed ------ an abuse of power and process no party could lawfully join. NRS 200.460. The district attorney was obligated by such Rules as 8.3(b) and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct to report 208-84FN to proper authorities and abstain from participation therein.

A court devoid of jurisdiction cannot hear any party. It can only dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction. New Orleans Mail Co. v. Flanders, La, 79 US 130 (1956); Ex parte Blankenship, 893 So2d 303 (Ala 2004); Phillips v. Bradshaw, 859 SW2d 232 (Mo 1993); Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 859 P2d 420 (1993); Pratts v. Hurley, 806 NE2d 992 (Ohio 2004); MCI WorldCom v. Pennsylvania PUC, 844 A2d 1239 (2004); Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah Tax Comm., 870 P2d 291 (1994); Young v. Clark, 65 P3d 1192 (Wa 2003); Trujillo v. Serrano, 871 P2d 369 (NM 1994); People v. Mueller, 851 P2d 211 (Colo 1992); Geerts v. Jacobsen, 100 P3d 1265 (Wy 2008). The magistrate here certainly had no authority to compel an out-of-state witness to appear at any hearing in 208-84FN.

A defendant's first appearance before a magistrate in a criminal action triggers his right to counsel under NRS 178.397 and the 6th Amendment. Brewer v. Williams, 430 US 387 (1977). Counsel was not provided for Mr. Rider's second appearance when a written complaint was filed in 208-84FN without the formal disposition of an original complaint or the good cause, written findings and court order required by NRS 174.085(5) in 1984 before any remedial complaint could be filed. Poceeding further in 208-84FN was, thus, without the due process of law required in criminal actions. 

Without proper motion or notice, the magistrate had no authority to allow the district attorney to intervene and amend or join any offense. Monroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975); Maheu v. District Court, 88 Nev 26, 493 P2d 709 (1972); Iveson v. District Court, 66 Nev 145, 206 P2d 755 (1949). No new offense could lawfully be added to the action by any amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115; Ex Parte Alexander, 80 Nev 354, 393 P2d 615 (1963) (want of allegation of crime in Nevada cannot be cured by amendment). 208-84FN thus remained under improper extra-judicial control. Sheriff v. Davis, 106 Nev 145, 787 P2d 1241 (1990). Mr. Rider under unlawful restraint.


The lop-sided half-record developed through the concerted acts and omissions of the magistrate, the complainants and the prosecutor to obstruct notice vitiated the adversarial process and the impartial decision making function of the courts:

A. Brady Material 

The absence of a proper pleading at the first (and second) appearance is an improper evidentiary void in the record the details of which will forever remain a mystery to the defense. Parsons v. District Court, 110 Nev 1239, 1244 n 4, 885 P2d 1316 (1994) (magistrate's reliance on his own personal knowledge in adjudicating a matter in favor of a defendant was prejudicial to the state); Ivey v. State, 82 Nev 448, 420 P2d 853 (1966) (in-camera review of probable cause denies precepts basic to our system of justice); Daniel v. State, 119 Nev 498, 78 P3d 890 (2003) (unrecorded interview with reluctant witness is improper); Mazzan v. Warden, 116 Nev 48, 993 P2d 25 (2000) (information provided orally, as opposed to written form, was inadequate under Brady); Lay v. State, 116 Nev 1185, 14 P3d 1256 (2000) (prior statement of witness is material). Shelby v. District Court, 82 Nev 204, 414 F2f 942 (1966) citing Scott v. State, 81 Nev 380, 404 P2d3 (1965) (probable cause cannot be determined in absence of complete record). The evidentiary void here is an apparent absence of probable cause ---- factual innocence ---- the prosecution was obligated to timely document and file in effort to invoke the court's jurisdiction at commencement of the action. NRS 171.178(4)

B. False Complaint, False Evidence

Conclusory allegations are patently insufficient to support a finding of probable cause by an impartial magistrate. Watson v. Sheriff, 93 Nev 403, 566 P2d 416 (1977).

The written complaint filed in 208-84FN was not qualified by information and belief but consisted instead of the direct and positive allegations of Officer T. Harry to give the appearance of probable cause without reference to second-hand information. DeHardit v. United States, 224 F2d 673 (4 Cir 1955). That complaint could only have been made by an eyewitness to its contents. NRS 199.200 (unqualified statement of what one does not know to be true is a false statement); Lane v. District Court, 104 Nev 427, 760 P2d 1245 (1988) (witness not present at time of alleged sexual assault is not competent to testify that victim consented). That complaint obviated the magistrate's duty under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964) to assess the credibility of second-hand information as well as the magistrate's duty under NRS 171.186 to disclose adequate information to Mr. Rider to enable the  investigation and impeachment of the subject matter authorized by NRS 171.196 prior to preliminary examination. Franks v. Delaware, 438 US 154 (1977). The magistrate held Mr. Rider for further proceedings on the complaint without performing those constitutional judicial duties.

It is unlikely Officer Harry would observe ongoing sexual activity if felonious at the time it occurred. The testimony adduced at the preliminary examination was not shown to have been evidence of those unlikely observations. NRS 50.025. As such, that testimony was no more than false evidence of the dubious crimes alleged in Officer Harry's complaint. Miller v. Pate, 386 US 1 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 US 264 (1959); Alcorta v. Texas, 355 US 28 (1957). The very resort to such practice undermined due process and the credibility necessary to a finding of probable cause by a neutral magistrate. Spinelli v. United State, 393 US 410 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108 (1964); Marcum v. Sheriff, 85 Nev 175, 451 P2d 845 (1969); Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev 414, 442 P2d 916 (1968). 

C. NRS 171.206 

The 4th Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended pretrial detention. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 US 103 (1975). NRS 171.206 is therefore unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed the only ostensible probable cause determination in 208-84FN to be made some 40 days after warrantless arrest. Cf. Powell v. State, 108 Nev 700, 838 P2d 921 (1992) (statute allowing detention beyond 48 hours without judicial determination of probable violates the 4th Amendment). The magistrate therefore lacked constitutionally authority to proceed in the manner established by the record in NLVJC Case No. 208-84FN.

NRS 171.206 cannot give the magistrate power to strip an essential jurisdictional witness from the action by proceeding on allegations neither he nor Officer Harry personally witnessed, Garnick v. District Court, 81 Nev 521, 407 P2d 163 (1965) (action may only proceed on allegations made at arraignment), allegations for which alternate witnesses had become unavailable with the passage of time, Boggs v. State, 95 Nev 911, 604 P2d 107 (1979) (bad faith and connivance that purges an action of evidence warrants dismissal). New and distinct allegations simply may not be brought into an action by amendment or joinder. NRS 173.095; NRS 173.115. See also State v. Chamberlain, 6 Nev 257 (1871) (foundation for warrant under NRS 173.145 may not be materially altered by court, or defense counsel). Proceeding to commit Mr. Rider on allegations distinct from those alleged in the complaint would nullify all rights granted by NRS 171.186 and NRS 171.196 and Coleman v. Alabama, 399 US 1 (1970) or Faretta v. California, 422 US 806 (1975). A magistrate can have no authority to effect that plain constitutional error through his abdication of responsibility to afford timely examination upon adequate notice.

D. "Duly" Filed Information Constitutionally Required

An affidavit of arrest based on information and belief derived from police reports compiled in NLVPD file No. 84-4877 was placed into the record of commitment filed in district court after preliminary examination and indicates that Officer Harry most likely lacked first hand personal knowledge of that subject matter. 
Leave to file an information by affidavit was never sought or obtained. Mr. Rider never waived preliminary examination. Sturrock v. State, 95 Nev 938, 604 P2d 341 (1979).

The Information filed in district court case No. C67112 was upon the representation that Mr. Rider received a preliminary examination as provided by law before a justice of the peace who held him to answer upon a finding of probable cause. NRS 173.035(1). The only ostensible prelimary examination here was for the specific crimes alleged in Officer Harry's complaint.

E. Defense Counsel Would Most Likely Have Conspired With Each Other, the NLVPD, the NLV City Attorney, the Prosecutor, the Magistrate and Judge Goldman to Elicit a Coerced Guilty Plea, But a Full and Fair Hearing Could Add or Remove Parties From That List.

Counsel never questioned the validity of their appointment or a request for appointment in the absence of proper notice.

Counsel objected to the continuance of the preliminary examination and requested an OR but never sought to enforce the affected rights through mandamus, prohibition or habeas corpus. Counsel left his client unlawfully detained and isolated where assaulted, battered and threatened with murder if he did not "fess up."

Subsequent counsel did not address the issue of the charges and the information filed, seek defects or offer defenses. Counsel badgered Mr. Rider into demanding a polygraph test that was limited by the examiner to the objective abduction and restraint allegations because Mr. Rider could not be tested on another's "will." Mr. Rider denied the abduction and restraint allegations made at the preliminary examination and received a score  of  +11. 

Counsel insisted the polygraph test was limited to kidnapping alone, delivered the unverified test results to the prosecution and "guaranteed" conviction at trial, where eight (8) consecutive life sentences were the likely result. 

Counsel secured no physical or testimonial evidence to rebut or support a denial of the abduction and restraint allegations at trial. Counsel claimed no prejudice to her ability to secure such evidence. To her, all would be well and good if the kidnapping charge was dismissed pursuant to plea bargain negotiations.


A. Non-Subjugated Victim

Officer Harry swears the female in his complaint was subjected to sexual penetration by nothing more than an act of sexual penetration. The identicle allegation of operative fact in the Information expressly negates any inducement to sexual penetration, actual or constructive, and limits any meaning of the term "against her will" to a state of mind declared by the legislature to be criminally liable. NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm). See alsoBasurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice who must be corroborated). 

Deadly force to prevent the sexual penetration alleged here would be punishable as murder. NRS 200.200 (killing must be absolutely necessary to prevent great bodily harm; would-be combatant must endeavor to avoid alleged conflict). There could be no victim of Involuntary Servitude in pari materia because that crime requires subjugation by restraint, physical force or specified threat. NRS 200.463(1). COUNT IV thus fails to allege any form of non-consent proscribed by the Legislature, or the common law. Mills v. United States, 164 US 644 (1897) (force inherent in act of penetration is insufficient to negate consent). 

B. Strict Liability

The record contains no stipulation or agreement under EJDC Rule 7.50 to waive jury trial, speedy trial, preliminary examination, counsel, remedy, defense or defect. The canvass shows no explanation of the term "against her will" and never mentions non-consent, a lack of consent, a defense of consent, consent nor any criminal intent. Unless the record shows an admission by Mr. Rider to the crime of sexual assault, his guilty plea was further accepted in violation of due process. Hanley v. State, 97 Nev 130, 624 P2d 1387 (1981).

Mr. Rider's factual admission that the female was "afraid to resist" and sexually penetrated "against her will" was not an admission of guilt under NRS 200.366 because his innocent intent and an uncorroborated lack of desire are not mutually exclusive. Honeycutt v, State, 118 Nev 660, 56 P3d 362 (2002) (reasonable mistaken belief in consent negates the requisite criminal intent regardless of victim's belief in non-consent). Nor were his factual admissions competent because he, like Mr. Honeycutt, cannot read other peoples' minds or be permitted to testify directly thereto. State v. Butner, 67 Nev 436, 220 P2d 631 (1950) (lay witness, after stating the facts, may give opinion on another's state of mind). The plea canvass plainly shows an involuntary admission to another's free will --- an instance of psychological torture --- which, incidentally, ignores the intent to act without consent that was an element of sexual assault in 1984. Williams v. State, 95 Nev 830, 603 P2d 694 (1979). 

Sexual intercourse, without opposition in particular, suggests an innocent intent as does the non-compelled nature of the intercourse alleged in Count IV while the denial of kidnapping indicates the female was in a place of her own choosing. Despite this reasonable basis for an inference that sex was voluntary, Judge Goldman inquired no further. That psychopath developed no factual basis for an opinion on the female's will because Mr. Rider admitted the actual state of mind alleged in Count IV. It was unnecessary to ask if she appeared afraid to resist for the added reason that Mr. Rider was not charged with subjecting her to penetration with afraid to resist and he did not agree to plead guilty to doing so. Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev 681, 669 P2d 244 (1983). His guilty plea only admitted the well pled facts in Count IV. Giese v. Chief of Police, 87 Nev 522, 489 P2d 1163 (1971). 

The plea canvass shows no interjection from counsels because Mr. Rider was collectively singled out amidst disputed facts for conviction under a theory of strict liability: non-subjugated intercourse, regardless of any contemporaneous act or expression and in spite of the female's liability under long standing criminal law. See e.g., Forsha v. State, 8 Nev 137 (1872) (self defense requires a good faith endeavor by would-be combatant to avoid alleged conflict); Basurto v. State, 86 Nev 567, 472 P2d 339 (1970) (one who participates in sex due to fear of great bodily harm is not an accomplice); Lerner Shops v. Marin, 83 Nev 75, 423 P2d 398 (1967) (there is no false imprisonment where victim submits to mere verbal direction unaccompanied by force or threat); NRS Chapter 201 (sex for gain, indecent exposure and public sex acts are crimes regardless of gender); NRS 195.020 (one who aids or abets an unlawful act is a principle who must be proceeded against and punished as such); NRS 194.010(8) (all parties are liable to punishment for their acts or omissions unless induced by fear of great bodily harm). 
As a result, the canvass negates neither voluntariness nor culpability for any misrepresentation. Cf. McNair v. State, 108 Nev 53, 825 P2d 571 (1992) (sexual assault may be committed by fraud). 

Lastly, the question of consent between two parties cannot be answered from this record as a matter of law because: a defendant's duress is strictly limited by NRS 194.010(8) to a fear of great bodily harm, exclusively, regardless of race, nationality or gender. An inducement below that threshold would be legally untenable --- frivolous --- unlike Officer Harry's allegation of no inducement at all however.


Although the state of mind Mr. Rider possessed while inserting his penis into a concious woman's exposed vagina was ignored at the change of plea hearing, an excerpt from an interview with the Department of Parole and Probation sheds considerable light on that universally crucial subject:

Judge Goldman did not ensure Mr. Rider had been provided a copy of the PSI Report, informed of its significance or afforded an opportunity to interpose objections which violated NRS 176.156 and due process, if material. Shields v. State, 97 Nev 472, 634 P2d 468 (1981). 

Judge Goldman admonished defense counsel that the lack of physical injury to the 19 year old female was irrelevant. He imposed a term of life without parole upon the bald assertion that the her disappearance and refusal to cooperate with authorities was due to severe psychological trauma. Judgment was not imposed under NRS 200.366(2)(a) or (2)(b) but was imposed instead for some undefined, generic, imaginary form of sexual assault never proscribed by the Legislature. 

The PSI report forwarded to the Department of Prisons recounts the allegations adduced at the preliminary examination ------- allegations for which Mr. Rider was actively denied notice and opportunity to defend personally or with the assistance of competent counsel. Cole v. Arkansas, 333 US 196 (1948). 


There was no direct appeal urging clarification, modification or nullification of existing state law nor the demarcation of factual innocence thereunder. Stovall v. Denno, 388 US 293 (1967) (to deny full opportunity to appeal a conviction because the accused is poor is to infect the proceeding with the clear danger of convicting the innocent). In this case, an apparent myth distinguishing voluntary sex from consensual sex went unquestioned.

In Mr. Rider's first habeas proceeding, Judge Fondi determined that defense counsel had obtained sufficient facts to rebut the kidnapping but that he would have been convicted of sexual assault (86-00151H). But seeWright v. State, 94 Nev 415, 581 P2d 442 (1978) (the forcible taking necessary for the crime of robbery requires restraint under the kidnapping statute); United States v. Hearst, 563 F2d 1331 (9 Cir 1977) (defendant who claimed she was kidnapped and forced to rob banks was convicted of robbery because able to abandon her alleged captors). Judge Fondi's determination that the guilty plea was not improperly motivated by threat of additional punishment was unworthy of support from Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357 (1978) for the added reason that Bordenkircher requires probable cause to charge an offense defined by the legislature. The state declined to justify its threat with the charging document or the justice court record. Given the absence of restraint described above, it is unlikely the State could have credibly shown a sexual assault. The record before the original habeas courts was therefore inadequate to conclusively show Mr. Rider was entitled to no relief on his claim that his plea was coerced, unknowing and involuntary. 

The State's motion to dismiss Mr. Rider 's claims was constructively ex parte because not delivered to him by prison officials and granted by the court while his attorney's motion for relief based upon the State's failure to file any opposition to said claims was pending before the court. SeeMonroe Ltd v. Central Telelphone Co., 91 Nev 450, 538 P2d 152 (1975) (dispositive orders on motions without fair opportunity for the non-moving party to respond are improper); Gebers v. State, 118 Nev 500, 50 P3d 1092 (2002) (development of facts without prisoner's participation denies due process). The Nevada Supreme Court declined to expand the record on appeal pursuant to Bryant v. State, 102 Nev 268, 721 P2d 368 (1986) (entire trial court record should be reviewed) and dismissed without briefing or argument pursuant to Luckett v. Warden, 91 Nev 681, 541 P2d 910 (1975) (third appeal cannot show error) while Mr. Rider's motion was pending for the appointment of counsel to assist him on his first appeal as of right:

The Supreme Court determined that Mr. Rider had been thoroughly canvassed and made a factual admission on the record that contained all the elements of the crime for which he was convicted (No. 18138). 

That Mr. Rider's post-conviction efforts were thwarted by official misconduct grows more apparent when considering: his inadequate canvass claim was procedurally defaulted because not raised on direct appeal. Davis v. State, 115 Nev 17, 974 P2d 658 (1999). By reaching the merits of that defaulted claim however, the original habeas courts implicitly found good cause from defense counsel's failure to perfect a direct appeal. Fawaz v. State, 105 Nev 682, 783 P2d 425 (1989). But instead of acknowledging that the original habeas courts erred by failing to presume prejudice under Strickland from counsel's failure to appeal, Justices Maupin, Agosti and Becker relegated themselves to fabrications to dispose of Mr. Rider's subsequent request for appellate counsel. 

Their premise that he waited until 1998 to request appellate counsel is patently false. Their position that a guilty plea is invalid if defense counsel fails to appeal contradicts NRS 34.810(1)(a) and NRS 177.375 as well as that court's decision in Franklin v. State, 110 Nev 750, 877 P2d 1058 (1994) where they determined the only relief available in such cases was to appoint counsel to assist the prisoner with a belated appeal that challenges the validity of the plea or sentence. If the specious theories applied to Mr. Rider were correct, arguendo, Mr. Franklin would have been allowed to withdraw his plea upon finding that his attorney erred by failing to appeal. But that plainly was not the result in Franklin or in Mr. Rider's first habeas proceeding where he alleged his plea was entered without effective assistance, the courts implicitly found his attorney ineffective for failing to appeal, and relief was denied. 

CHAPTER 3: Involuntary $ervitude

It should be obvious that two or more persons acted in concert to subject Mr. Rider (and unknown others), without due process, to a form of 4th class citizenship, a component of which is the compulsion to service under ex-felon registration laws, by threat of death or imprisonment.

The relevant Tier III crimes under the Adam Walsh Act require the knowing use of force or fear of harm by the offender to negate consent and evince the requisite intent. HR REP 99-594 (1986). Non-forced, non-commercial, private sex between adults is protected and does not require registration under the AWA. Green v. Georgia, 987 FSupp2d 1328 (2013) citing Powell v. State, 270 Ga 327, 510 SE2d 18 (1998).

The use or threat of violence is not an element of sexual assault. Weber v. State, 121 Nev 554, 119 P3d 107 (2005). The closest federal equivalent to that state offense is sexual contact without permission under 18 USC 2244(b) which was enacted in 1986 as a misdemeanor and became a felony by amendment in 2006. No conviction for a petty offense triggers a burden to register under the AWA because that act only targets those convicted of a criminal offense. 42 USC 16911(5)(A). Therefore, a state conviction prior to 2006 for an offense equal to 18 USC 2244(b) cannot trigger Tier III registration burdens under the AWA without the retroactive elevation of a misdemeanor to a felony, and the application of federal law by geographic happenstance.

NRS 179D.441 requires the targeted individual to routinely supply law enforcement with data for publication on a website, monitor and update that information when necessary to ensure the data is current within a 48 hour margin of error, at his own expense, in perpetuity. The fair market value of that on-call "civil" data service is estimated to exceed $250,000 per year, per individual, as the approximate cost to the Department of Public Safety of obtaining their desired information by alternate means, at their own expense. Restitution is mandatory. 18 USC 1593.

A refusal to award fair market value for accepted services plainly undermines the honesty and integrity behind the characterization of registration laws as "civil" regulation as it exposes the punitive exploitation of a disfavored subclass.

To the extent the use of force rejected by the jury in Powell, inferred by the court in Weber and expressly disavowed by Count IV of the Information filed is serving as the due foundation for a burden to register, that would indicate a denial of jury trial and a prohibited Bill of Attainder.


* This blog is protected by 18 USC 1584(b) as a report of human trafficking activity. 

* Count I alleges the female was inveigled against her will and without her consent which … identifies her will and her consent as distinct concepts.

* The victim in NLVPD File No. 84-4877 was 19 years old, armed, transient and unemployed. When asked if willing to take a polygraph, she left the state and refused to cooperate.

* In an unrecorded statement, the victim changed the location of her alleged abduction. No witnesses were subsequently located to support or rebut her allegations.